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In recent years, the rising pay level and complex compensation mechanism of the 
top managers of listed companies in our country is paid more and more attention by 
the public.  
This paper studies the issue of the compensation dispersion within the private 
listed companies based on the institutional background of China, and investigates the 
incentive effect of compensation dispersion on firm performance. In addition, the 
moderating role of managerial power is explored in this study. Taking the implication 
of compensation dispersion as two kinds of dispersion, which contains the 
compensation dispersion within the top managers and that between the managers and 
the employees, we get the following findings from this study: 
(1) There is significant positive correlation between the compensation dispersion 
within the top managers of Chinese private listed companies, which is consistent with 
the concludes of the Tournament Theory; (2) There is significant positive correlation 
between the compensation dispersion between the managers and the employees of 
Chinese private listed companies, which is also consistent with the concludes of the 
Tournament Theory; (3) The managerial power boosts the incentive effect of the 
compensation dispersion on firm performance in future, whether which kind of 
dispersion referred above; (4)Furthermore, the size of the company and the 
operational risk it’s facing will make significant effect on the tournament incentive 
effect, while the quality of corporate governance, the industry and the area do not 
make apparent differences in the mechanism of the tournament incentives. 
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收入的 18 倍左右，国有企业高管工资则是社会平均工资的 128 倍[3]。事实上，
高管团队内、高管与员工之间薪酬差距较大是中西方企业中普遍存在的现实状




















































































自 1992 年 6 月 2 日第一家民营企业华源实业（股市编号：000014）在深圳
证券交易所开始挂牌交易以来，我国民营上市公司的队伍不断发展壮大，截止
2010 年 6 月，我国沪深两市的民营上市公司 769 家，占据全市场上市公司数量
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